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Abstract: Economic growth requires confidence in the state’s ability to enforce secure exchange. But when states selectively
enforce rule of law, political considerations can moderate the trust that buyers have in sellers. I argue that political connec-
tions produce moral hazard in exchange because they introduce biases in expectations of judicial enforcement. Buyers avoid
trade with politically connected sellers, and, in this context of unequal enforcement, formal contracts disproportionately
protect politically connected buyers. To examine these features of connections and contracts, I created a sales business in
Senegal and randomized whether employees signaled political connections and/or offered formal contracts during trans-
actions. The results show that political connections decreased buyers’ willingness to exchange. Formal contracts increased
exchange, though primarily for connected buyers. These findings show that asymmetric political connections can impede
daily trade and intensify economic inequalities in developing contexts, while simultaneously demonstrating the limits of
state institutions for mitigating politically driven moral hazard.
Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, pro-
cedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UIFXGX.
Introduction
Confidence in basic forms of exchange is a funda-mental building block for societies (Arrow 1972;North 1991). For an economy to function and
grow, buyers must be confident that sellers will honor
purchases and deliver the products promised to them.
This is particularly true for modern markets where pay-
ment is due prior to product delivery, and where op-
portunities arise for seller moral hazard. For example,
sellers may pocket payment and then deliver substan-
dard goods, or may fail to deliver promised products al-
together. Such seller moral hazard has become a salient
problem for both firms and individuals in developing
countries as emerging markets grow. Businesses cannot
always rely on repeated trading relationships (e.g., Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy 2002), and consumers similarly
engage in one-shot exchanges with sellers who offer de-
livery contingent on payment. Agreeing to buy and at
least partly pay an unfamiliar seller before a good is de-
livered or its quality can be verified is a common feature
of modern economies.
In countries with weak or selectively enforced rule
of law, however, inequality in the application of rule of
law can moderate buyers’ confidence in sellers (North
and Weingast 1989). These are places where who one
knows can drastically affect business operations. Know-
ing someone in government can serve as a form of
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protection from punishment: A seller’s political con-
nectivity grants relative impunity in the case of failure
to deliver promised goods. Although there are certainly
many benefits to possessing political connections (e.g.,
Szakonyi 2018), political inequalities between sellers and
buyers may also stifle trade by exacerbating perceptions
of seller moral hazard. Furthermore, this context of in-
formal influences may complicate how citizens view the
utility of state contracting institutions. Given the ubiq-
uity of legal inequalities in developing countries, under-
standing how they affect propensities to engage in trade
has significant implications for economic development.
In this article, I propose a theory of seller moral
hazard in exchange in societies with selective rule of
law. Due to the preferential treatment that political
connections confer in these societies, buyers believe that
politically connected sellers can break contracts with
relative impunity. As a result, buyers avoid trade when
sellers are politically connected and seek trade when
sellers are less connected. In the context of these political
inequalities, state-backed formal contracts may fail to
mitigate risk for all types of buyers: If the successful en-
forcement of contracts is dependent on political access,
they may only be useful to politically connected buyers.
This theory implies that asymmetric political power
shapes private-sector exchange and reinforces economic
inequalities, and that political connections disrupt the
function of formal institutions for contracting.
To study the impacts of political connections and
contracts on private-sector exchange, I designed a field
experiment in the urban environment of Dakar, Senegal.
Its mixture of semireliable state institutions and salient
informal influences made Senegal a fitting setting in
which to test this theory. The field experiment sought to
replicate a natural trading environment with real finan-
cial stakes and seller moral hazard. To that end, I created
and legally registered a sales business, and hired employ-
ees to sell a mobile phone credit service with purchase
options that captured different types of risk to 1,458
households.1 In a factorial design, I randomized whether,
during transactions, my employees signaled their po-
litical connections and/or offered formal contracts. As
outcomes, I measured whether respondents purchased
any level of phone credit (where the risk was that the
phone credit was not of the promised quality),2 as well
as whether respondents purchased a level with delayed
1The business did not generate positive net profits; it was created
solely for research purposes.
2Phone credit in Senegal can have varying levels of quality, which
can be unclear upon delivery. I describe this in greater detail in the
“Context” section.
delivery (which entailed the additional risk of poten-
tial nondelivery). To ensure that political connections
were credible and consistent across employees, I part-
nered with three influential municipal councils in Dakar
that agreed to hire and host my employees prior to the
field experiment. During transactions, employees briefly
mentioned their past employment at the councils to
treated households as part of the extended introduction
phase common to interactions in Senegal. To measure the
political connections of buyers—as well as to parse the
mechanisms by which the treatments operated—I imple-
mented an endline survey among the sample several days
after transactions occurred.
The results of the field experiment confirm that po-
litical connections can stifle exchange. Driven by the risk
of substandard quality of products, overall purchase rates
declined when sellers signaled their political connections.
Taking buyers’ political connections into account shows
that reduced levels of trade with politically connected
sellers were driven by politically connected buyers. These
results are robust to interacting treatment with covari-
ates that are correlated with buyer political connections,
as well as to buyer–seller coethnicity and coreligiosity, the
primary competing explanations of nonstate contract en-
forcement in markets like Senegal’s. I also rule out the
possibility that the political connection treatment oper-
ated by affecting the perceived competence or quality of
sellers. Rather, sellers’ political connections affect buyers’
perceived recourse options: Successfully resolving a con-
tract dispute is a more difficult prospect when the oppos-
ing party is politically connected.
The results also show that formal contracts sub-
stantially increased propensities to trade, particularly
with purchases involving delayed delivery. This finding
is somewhat surprising in that it demonstrates that for-
mal contracts can mitigate risk and boost confidence in
exchange even in markets with weak norms of enforce-
ment. But exploring this result more deeply reveals a
less rosy picture: The positive effects of formal contracts
were driven by buyers who were politically connected
themselves. Offering formal contracts had a substantially
smaller effect on unconnected buyers’ confidence in ex-
change. This finding suggests that formal contracts may
be useful primarily for already-privileged citizens in soci-
eties with selective rule of law. In these contexts, state in-
stitutions may counterproductively perpetuate inequali-
ties in private-sector exchange.
Overall, these results offer suggestive evidence that
political connections can stifle private-sector exchange,
and show that formal contracts favor the powerful under
weak rule of law. This article thus makes several con-
tributions. First, this project shows partial equilibrium
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effects for how individualized political connections
can constrain private-sector growth, whereas existing
work on political connections tends to emphasize other
dimensions along which these connections can be prof-
itable (e.g., Roberts 1990; Fisman 2001; Khwaja and Mian
2005; Faccio 2006). These studies condition on firms
that already exist or on exchanges that already occurred.
My findings, by contrast, provide evidence that political
connections may prevent deals from occurring in the
first place, implying that extant work may suffer from
selection bias and mischaracterize the value of political
connections. Furthermore, there has been a dearth of ev-
idence connecting individualized political connections—
which serve different purposes than firm-level political
connections and thus operate through different theo-
retical channels—to private-sector economic outcomes
in modern, urban markets. I provide experimental
evidence of this impact, carefully manipulating seller
moral hazard via the design-based innovation of creating
and operating a business to elucidate key aspects of the
theoretical dynamic. This article thus builds the evidence
base for an important yet underexamined mechanism.
Second, I show that political connections influence
trade even when controlling for established theories for
social enforcement in sub-Saharan Africa like coethnic-
ity and coreligiosity (Grimard 1997; Sanchez de la Sierra
2018). Political connections are nonascriptive, vary dy-
namically over time, and critically shape even demo-
graphically homogeneous societies. I thus argue that po-
litical connections merit study as a variable separate from
other forms of social group enforcement that rely on
mechanisms such as in-group pressure and reputation
costs (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2007).
My findings suggest that political connections operate
through an alternate mechanism: legal system bias. Po-
litical connections may help to explain unequal devel-
opment in the myriad societies where ethnicity is not a
salient political dimension (e.g., Posner 2004).
Finally, I provide evidence for the impact of institu-
tions on private-sector economic growth in states with
weak rule of law. It is striking that contracts can increase
confidence in exchange in Senegal, despite its reputation
for weak contract enforcement. The results of this arti-
cle suggest that, even in trying environments, people do
believe in the state to some degree. And although exist-
ing work suggests that institutions are important because
they facilitate trade and improve growth prospects (e.g.,
North 1991; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), I add nuance
by pointing to important distributional implications that
are likely to enhance inequalities. I show that formal con-
tracts can accentuate power differentials, and may thus
fail to protect nonconnected citizens in societies where
recourse options depend on political connections. These
findings demonstrate that individual-level political con-
nections can impede trade and limit the effectiveness of
legal institutions for growth.
Theory
Existing work has shown that the state can enforce se-
cure exchange (e.g., North and Weingast 1989) or that
enforcement equilibria can emerge in the absence of co-
operative state institutions (e.g., Greif 1989).3 However,
in much of the world, particularly developing democra-
cies, states have the capacity to enforce contracts and in-
stitutions are generally cooperative, but state agents are
biased in the application of rule of law toward certain
parties (Holland 2016; North 1990). Those who possess
connections to people in power receive preferential treat-
ment, including in the business environment. This set-
ting can give rise to buyer moral hazard (Sanchez de la
Sierra 2018) as well as seller moral hazard—pocketing
payment and delivering substandard products or failing
to deliver goods altogether. In this section, I develop a
theory of seller moral hazard, outlining the roles of both
sellers’ political connections and formal contracts as well
as how buyers’ connections might moderate their effects.
Seller Political Connections and Formal
Contracts in Exchange
Political connections are invaluable to firms when states
selectively enforce the rule of law. Politically connected
firms amass greater profit (Fisman 2001; Szakonyi 2018),
achieve larger market valuations (Faccio 2006), and gain
access to preferential state financing (Khwaja and Mian
2005). Dealing with politically connected firms can thus
offer lucrative opportunities for potential business part-
ners, including access to preferred markets, better capi-
tal, and a launching pad for developing one’s own polit-
ical connections. However, the relevance and probability
of realizing these advantages are different for individuals
than for firms. Although firms might value access to new
markets, for example, this benefit is irrelevant to indi-
viduals engaging in one-shot exchanges with businesses.
And even though individuals have incentives to develop
their own political connections, they are unlikely to do
so by trading with firm representatives they will never
meet again. This is especially true of the types of trade
3See Online Appendix Q (p. SI12) for more discussion of the liter-
ature on commitment problems in exchange.
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that I focus on in this article, increasingly common in
modern economies: one-shot exchanges involving seller
moral hazard.
For individual buyers, the risks of trading with con-
nected sellers often outweigh the potential benefits. Buy-
ers are hesitant to purchase from politically powerful sell-
ers because connected sellers are able to break contracts
with relative impunity: The state’s selective application of
the rule of law enables connected people to escape pun-
ishment more easily than nonconnected people (Lu, Pan,
and Zhang 2015). In disputes with state-backed sellers,
buyers expect the state—either in the form of courts or
the more commonly used police and local mediators—
to enforce in favor of politically connected sellers (Frye
2004). Politically connected parties are also more likely
to benefit from better access to and preferential enforce-
ment from nonstate institutions (Bhandari 2020). Thus,
because of the moral hazard they produce, sellers’ politi-
cal connections may stifle exchange.
Hypothesis 1: Sellers’ political connections decrease the
likelihood of exchange.
State-backed formal contracts could mitigate some
of these moral hazard concerns. Contracts provide proof
that a deal occurred, specify the responsibilities of the
exchanging parties, and safeguard against hazardous
exchanges (Williamson 1985). In large societies and
economies, contracts can serve as third-party enforce-
ment mechanisms that enable exchange to occur (Dixit
2003). Empirically, formal contracts have been shown
to increase trade by improving agents’ confidence in the
trustworthiness and enforceability of exchange (Sanchez
de la Sierra 2018). Assuming some level of rule of law
and function of enforcement institutions, we might thus
expect contracts on the margins to boost confidence in
trade. But in countries with weak rule of law, this effect
is not a given and varies depending on confidence in the
formal institutions backing exchange (Poppo and Zenger
2002).
Hypothesis 2: Formal contracts increase (do not have an
effect on) the likelihood of exchange.
The Moderating Role of Buyers’ Political
Connections
I argue that the advantages of political connections in
navigating the enforcement system accrue not only to
sellers with connections, but also to politically con-
nected buyers. Because connected buyers can preferen-
tially access enforcement institutions—cutting through
the red tape that holds up the majority of citizens—and
benefit from the bias of these institutions, connected
buyers have powers that unconnected ones do not. A
buyer’s political connections might thus mitigate con-
cerns of seller moral hazard and factor into the decision
calculus to engage in trade.
Asymmetric buyer–seller political connections may
similarly moderate perceptions of seller moral hazard
and propensities to exchange. During transactions char-
acterized by seller moral hazard, buyers can assess power
differentials and make decisions to trade accordingly.4
Holding fixed the terms of a given deal, we should ex-
pect a lower likelihood of trade when sellers are more
powerful than buyers. Correspondingly, buyers are more
likely to exchange when they have outsized influence rel-
ative to sellers. In situations where buyers are on similar
enforcement playing fields, the predictions are less clear.
When buyers and sellers are both unconnected, buyers
may assume the worst about sellers’ potential connec-
tions and thus choose not to exchange. When buyers and
sellers are both connected, the playing field is relatively
equal in terms of enforcement and buyers may choose
to trade, though not as much as they would if sellers
were unconnected. Table 1 summarizes these theoretical
predictions.
Hypothesis 3: Buyers are more likely to exchange when
they are politically connected and sellers are not,
and less likely to exchange when sellers are politically
connected and they are not.
In the context of these political power dynamics,
do formal contracts differentially moderate the percep-
tion of seller moral hazard for connected and uncon-
nected buyers? Formal contracts draw their power from
the authority of the state. Politically connected citizens
receive privileged access to and treatment from state
institutions, and thus the power to have contracts en-
forced is concentrated in the state-backed party. In the
buyer–seller theoretical framework, politically connected
buyers are more likely to have contracts enforced in
their favor than unconnected buyers, holding constant
the seller’s political connections. Thus, formal contracts
are more likely to mitigate perceptions of seller moral
hazard for connected buyers and should disproportion-
ately motivate connected types to exchange. In this way,
the use of formal institutions like formal contracts may
4Sellers may possess incentives to hide their political connections,
and in some cases this may mitigate the costs of being perceived as
connected. However, in developing democracies where informal
influences are rampant, buyers may already have preconceived no-
tions of sellers’ connectivity, or can make these assessments based
on extended introductions.
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TABLE 1 Theoretical Predictions Under Asymmetric Political Connections
Buyer is politically connected
No Yes
Seller is politically connected No Intermediate probability of purchase High probability of purchase
Yes Low probability of purchase Intermediate probability of purchase
unintentionally exacerbate inequality in environments
with selectively enforced rule of law.
Hypothesis 4: Formal contracts increase the likelihood of
exchange for connected buyers more than uncon-
nected buyers.
Context
Rule of Law and Methods of Enforcement
Senegal is a multiparty democracy in West Africa. De-
spite its democratic tendencies, however, Senegal’s rule
of law institutions remain weak. The World Bank ranks
Senegal at 140 of 190 economies in terms of overall ease
of doing business, and 142 in enforcing contracts. Its ju-
diciary is based on French civil law, generally considered
inferior to common law systems for securing property
rights and growth in Africa (Joireman 2001), and its le-
gal institutions suffer from excessive procedural formal-
ism, limited judicial independence, and high costs and
waiting times (Kondylis and Stein 2018). This results in
negative perceptions on the part of citizens of the judi-
ciary’s accessibility.
Despite these weaknesses, Senegalese citizens place
a relatively high degree of trust in legal institutions, at
least when politically connected parties are not involved.5
Still, most citizens are unlikely to use high-level courts or
lawyers to settle small-scale contract disputes—the type
this project probes—due to the significant financial and
time costs. Citizens typically first attempt to resolve petty
disputes amicably, which involves contacting the defector
(either directly or via shared social networks) and com-
ing to an agreed-upon resolution.6 If this fails, the af-
fected party may involve the local police or courts. These
means of enforcement become complicated by political
connections, however.
5See Online Appendix Figure J3 (p. SI8).
6For a discussion of social forms of enforcement in Senegal, see
Online Appendix R (pp. SI12–SI13).
Political Connections in Exchange
A commonly held view in Senegal is that political con-
nections lead to preferential treatment at all levels of
the state. With Senegal’s often labyrinthine bureau-
cratic structures, knowing someone in power allows for
quicker access, processing, and eventual success in mat-
ters involving the state. Connections reduce the massive
amounts of red tape with which unconnected citizens
must contend, and knowing even a low-level bureaucrat
can enhance the chances of gaining preferential access to
institutions. Getting one’s foot in the door can be among
the most difficult steps in the enforcement process,
and even nondirect connections help to overcome this
constraint via shared governmental networks.7 Political
connections thus play a significant role in the business
environment by determining access to means of enforce-
ment. Indeed, citizens anticipate that enforcement will
be biased toward the party with more political power
even when nonstate resolution mechanisms are used.
The consensus of my sample was that political con-
nections decrease the probability of punishment for con-
tract breach. Approximately 76% of respondents stated
that connections enable trading partners to escape pun-
ishment when they break contracts, and only 27% re-
ported confidence in local courts’ and police’s ability
to impartially enforce a contract when politically con-
nected people are involved. Figure 1 shows the extent to
which respondents believe that people with connections
to councils, courts, and police are able to escape pun-
ishment during contract disputes. Overall, there is severe
distrust in the enforcement process as it applies to politi-
cally connected sellers.
Contracts, Transactions, and the Phone
Credit Market
A formal contract in Senegal typically takes the form of
a written document that follows governmental standards
7For example, when asked how he resolved his past contract dis-
pute, a respondent stated that his sister worked as a secretary at the
local council, and was able to connect him to the local police chief
who helped him to file the correct paperwork.
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FIGURE 1 Connections and Perceived Impunity
Note: Sample’s responses when asked how political connections to the councils, courts, and
police affect the probability of escaping punishment during contract disputes. N = 1,458.
to be executable by local courts of law. Informal contracts
are those that do not meet this criteria, and in practice
are typically verbal agreements. In trade where delivery
is made after payment, contracts serve as more than de
facto receipts. Formal contracts include terms and con-
ditions, delineate the contracting parties’ responsibilities,
and outline procedures in case of contract breach that
make resolving disputes more streamlined.
Transactions with delayed delivery to households are
not uncommon in Dakar, particularly in densely popu-
lated neighborhoods. Although typically this type of sale
on credit at the household level has been done by infor-
mal traders, entrepreneurial growth in Senegal has led
to an increase in direct-to-household sales by formal-
sector businesses. For example, 82% of respondents in
my sample reported participation in door-to-door sales
campaigns in the past, some of which are run by major
telecommunications companies in the country. The mar-
ketplace for phone credit in Senegal lends itself to door-
to-door sales. Few people receive phone credit through
wireless subscription services. Rather, phone credit is
purchased as required, either from ambulatory traders or
from neighborhood kiosks. There is significant demand
for mobile credit, and prices are disproportionately high
relative to income, particularly in middle- to lower in-
come neighborhoods. Buyers are thus keen on alternate
methods for receiving phone credit, especially at com-
petitive prices. Important for the research design of this
project, phone credit in Senegal can have varying levels
of quality. The major wireless companies typically pro-
vide bonus credit as an incentive for buyers to purchase,
but this bonus credit is considered lower quality because
its use is restricted. Thus, bonus phone credit that is just
as good as “regular” credit is highly desirable, though the
quality of this credit may not be immediately apparent
upon purchase.
Research Design
I implemented a field experiment that allowed me to
carefully manipulate seller moral hazard in order to test
the effects of formal contracts and political connections
on exchange. To ensure a natural trading environment, I
created and registered a legal, formal-sector business in
Senegal, and hired employees to offer a phone credit ser-
vice via door-to-door sales in sample municipal districts.
In a factorial design, I randomized whether employees
signaled their political connections, as well as whether
they offered formal contracts as part of the deal. This
article thus takes a partial equilibrium approach to un-
derstand how connections and contracts affect propensi-
ties to exchange, holding other features of the seller and
transaction constant. An endline survey was conducted
several days after the transactions took place to measure
buyers’ political connections. The real economic envi-
ronment and the panel structure of the data allow for the
rare casual estimation of the effect of political connec-
tions and formal contracts on exchange based on politi-
cal asymmetries in the trading dyad.
Business Creation
In preparation for the experiment, I undertook the pro-
cess of creating and registering a formal business in Sene-
gal. I completed the process in 2016 at APIX, Senegal’s
primary agency for the promotion of investment and ma-
jor works, which is also home to Senegal’s guichet unique
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(one-stop shop) for formalizing a business.8 After suc-
cessfully formalizing the business, I received a unique
business identification number called the NINEA, which
is commonly understood in Senegal as proof that a busi-
ness is formal.9
The business, called Porte-à-Porte Sénégal (Door-
to-Door Senegal, or PAPS), offered discounted mobile
phone credits. Mobile credit was chosen as the activity
of interest for several reasons. First, this resembled com-
mon sales practices in Senegal, where ambulatory traders
sell small items including discounted phone credit di-
rectly to households.10 As mentioned above, 82% of re-
spondents in my sample said they had purchased items in
similar door-to-door sales campaigns in the past. Second,
there is high demand in Senegal for discounted mobile
phone credit, which helped to minimize the likelihood of
floor effects. Finally, the varying quality of phone credit
in Senegal, as well as the ability for phone credit to be de-
livered remotely at a later date, allowed for varying two
dimensions of seller moral hazard: the risk of substan-
dard product quality and the risk of nondelivery. There
is already a common distrust of the telecommunications
company in Senegal whose credit PAPS sold, which fur-
ther spurred respondents to consider the risk of the deal.
Ethical Considerations
This article is arguably the first to manipulate how busi-
nesses deploy political connections, which I was able to
accomplish by creating an original business. Though op-
erating a business enables testing heretofore untestable
development-related hypotheses in a realistic trading en-
vironment, it raises important ethical considerations.
These concerns include conducting research in a manner
appropriate to the local context, avoiding the displace-
ment of economic activity, and minimizing the misuse of
public resources.
To ensure that this project conformed to the local
context, I sought and gained approval from the Ministry
of Scientific Research in Senegal, the three district gov-
ernments in which I operated the business, and a research
8Despite the “one-stop” shop, registering the business required the
acquisition of certain documents that are not centrally controlled.
This required visits to a chef de quartier (neighborhood chief), po-
lice department, and government ministries.
9Online Appendix Figure A1 (p. SI2) shows a copy of the busi-
ness registration.
10Though the formalized method my company used to sell credit
at a discount was perhaps novel to some buyers, it is not unusual
during Senegal’s entrepreneurial boom in which small businesses
have formalized previously informal practices.
center in Dakar with which I have a longstanding rela-
tionship. All approved the project, and the research in-
stitution confirmed that the project “does not go against
cultural, social, or political norms in Senegal, and is in
line with what is appropriate for research here.” Because
such transactions are commonplace for respondents in
the sample districts, the IRB and Senegalese authorities
agreed that respondents could be debriefed at the be-
ginning of the endline survey, and although respondents
were given the option to withdraw from the study at that
point, none chose to do so. Furthermore, there was no
deception in business practices, as all who paid for phone
credit received the quality of credit they were promised
on the date that they were promised.
To avoid displacing existing economic activity, I en-
sured the minimal number of transactions necessary to
satisfy statistical power demands, and discussed the re-
search plan with the three local governments where I
conducted research activities. Sellers conducted transac-
tions with only 486 respondents in each district from an
average district population of around 165,000. Interviews
with local businesses and purveyors of phone credit con-
firmed they were unconcerned by the prospect of dis-
placed economic activity because of the limited reach and
duration of the project. Finally, APIX understood that the
business I registered was for research purposes, and con-
firmed that PAPS’ creation was not displacing other reg-
istration activity or otherwise misusing public resources.
Sample Selection and Partner Municipal
Councils
A key treatment arm in the experiment required sellers
to signal their political connections to buyers. For eth-
ical purposes as well as the interpretation of eventual
results, I ensured employees possessed political connec-
tions that were credible and consistent across the team.
To achieve this, I partnered with three influential munic-
ipal councils in Dakar, and arranged for my employees
to work at these councils prior to data collection. These
municipal units are the level of government with which
the average citizen in Dakar interacts most frequently,
and they have tremendous local influence across a range
of political and economic dimensions. For the purposes
of contract enforcement, being connected to the coun-
cil enables access to officials at numerous state organiza-
tions via shared governmental networks; these connec-
tions open side doors to many enforcement institutions.
Each of my employees performed a weeklong internship
at a partner council. The typical internship consisted
of rotating between the various divisions at the given
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council, gaining a sense of each division’s activities, and
meeting staff members throughout the council.
Of course, performing short internships with coun-
cils could result in a relatively weak type of political con-
nection, so this design might serve as a hard test of the
theory proposed above. Still, seemingly low-level politi-
cal connections are important to daily life in Senegal, as
they signal the types of networks and resources to which
an individual has access, regardless of how small the con-
nection may seem. Even casually knowing the right per-
son can change one’s dealings with bureaucratic struc-
tures entirely. Those without such connections do not
have access to the same recourse options that connected
individuals—especially those connected to powerful mu-
nicipal councils—do in the event of contract breach. As
demonstrated in a manipulation check later in the arti-
cle, buyers considered my employees to possess legitimate
political connections.
Because sellers had to work at the councils of the
communes in which I implemented the experiment, I
met with government administrators at communes that
fit the following criteria: (1) densely populated com-
munes inhabited primarily by middle- to lower income
workers for whom baseline takeup of discounted mo-
bile credit would be sufficiently high; 2) communes
where household access would be relatively straightfor-
ward (e.g., not obstructed by large gates, as is com-
mon in the more affluent neighborhoods of Dakar); and
(3) communes where household sales are commonplace
enough such that door-to-door transactions would not
be perceived as unusual. Of the five municipal govern-
ments I met with, three agreed to hire my employees and
permitted research activities to occur: Golf Sud, Médina,
and Pikine. I hired nine employees to work for my firm,
and thus three employees worked at each council.
Treatment Conditions
The experiment deployed a factorial design with three
treatment arms to test the effects of political connec-
tions and formal contracts on economic exchange. In the
first arm, sellers signaled their municipal council political
connections to buyers. They did so by briefly mentioning
their former work experience at the beginning of trans-
actions, during the lengthy introduction period that is
common to household transactions in Senegal.11 Rather
than recreate a general trading equilibrium, this treat-
ment aimed to induce buyers to consider the implications
11Online Appendix B (pp. SI2–SI3) presents an outline of the
transaction protocol that enumerators followed.
of sellers’ political connections. To rule out the con-
cern that the treatment may have appeared artificial or
strange to buyers, the endline survey asked buyers about
their skepticism; the evidence shows that suspicion was
low and not affected by treatment (see Online Appendix
Table N10, p. SI11).
In the second treatment arm, sellers included a for-
mal contract as part of the deal. The contract contained
key information about the terms of the deal, method of
payment, and delivery. Critically, the contract also in-
cluded a clause on the method of conflict resolution and
procedures for recourse in the case of contract breach.12
If PAPS failed to deliver the quality or amount of mo-
bile credit that buyers purchased, the contract stipulated
that attempts would be made to resolve the dispute am-
icably before bringing the case before local courts. This
mirrored the language of standard contracts in Senegal.
Indeed, the contract was reviewed and approved by a
Senegalese law firm, which deemed it to be executable
in local courts of law. Sellers explained the contract dur-
ing transactions, and briefly mentioned that the contract
contained information about recourse options. In this
treatment arm, buyers and sellers were both required to
sign two copies of the contract in order to execute the
deal, as is standard in Senegal; the buyer kept one copy,
and PAPS kept the other.
For the third and final treatment arm, sellers again
offered formal contracts as part of the deal, but in this
arm the formal contract was optional. To mimic the
transaction costs of contracting, buyers receiving this
treatment could elect to have a formal contract for a
marginal additional cost. This is consistent with the costs
of contracting in Senegal, where, at the end of some
transactions, sellers offer a receipt or contract at a very
small fee. Sellers explained this fee as an administrative
requirement due to the costs of contracting in the for-
mal sector. Although there is a risk that some buyers may
have found this option to be unusual, Online Appendix
Table N10 (p. SI11) shows that, in line with expecta-
tions in Senegal, this treatment arm did not raise buyers’
suspicions. The two formal contract treatment arms at-
tempted to capture variation in the extent to which sellers
constrain themselves with contracts; in some cases, they
fully constrain themselves by requiring a contract to be
signed, and in others, the formal contract serves more
as a nonbinding signal. Table 2 summarizes the com-
ponents of the factorial design and shows the six treat-
ment groups.
12Online Appendix C (p. SI3) includes a translation of this clause.
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TABLE 2 Treatment Groups
Contract availability
No contract Contract (required) Contract (optional)
Signaled No Pure control Required contract Optional contract
connections Yes Connection Connection + required contract Connection + optional contract
Data Collection
There were two main stages of data collection: (1) the
transaction phase during which sellers sold the phone
credit service and (2) an endline panel survey several
days after transactions took place. During the transac-
tion stage, sellers followed the randomization scheme as
described in the next subsection and conducted door-
to-door sales in the three sample communes. At the end
of each transaction, sellers completed a self-administered
survey in which they noted the questions buyers asked
during transactions, as well as answered subjective ques-
tions about buyers’ politeness, confusion, and suspicion.
In total, sellers conducted transactions with 1,458 re-
spondents.
Three to five days following the transactions in each
district, enumerators administered an endline survey to
sample respondents. Endline surveys were conducted by
different enumerators than those who performed the
original transactions, in order to minimize social desir-
ability bias for questions about seller quality and com-
petence, as well as to avoid awkwardness of being sur-
veyed by someone previously associated with a business
deal. Of the 1,458 buyers who participated in transac-
tions, enumerators conducted the endline survey with
1,422 respondents.13
Critically, the endline survey included questions that
measured buyers’ political connections. Enumerators
asked respondents about family, friends, and personal
experience working at a variety of state institutions,
including national government, councils, courts, and
the police.14 I code respondents as politically connected
if they report a connection. This follows from the
understanding that in Senegal, possessing any political
connection can improve enforcement probability relative
to unconnected citizens, as even low-level connections
13Online Appendix Table G4 (p. SI6) shows that treatment does
not predict differential rates of endline attrition. Covariates for
missing respondents at endline were imputed using sample means;
results throughout are robust to excluding these missing respon-
dents.
14Online Appendix Table O11 (p. SI11) shows that buyers to whom
sellers signaled political connections did not overreport their own
political connections.
can help grant access to otherwise hermetic institutions.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of the sample reporting
political connections.
Randomization
I implemented a block randomized design wherein six
geographically sequential sample households constituted
a block, with all six treatment groups represented in
each block. Blocks were thus essentially microneigh-
borhoods, similar in both observable and unobservable
street-level variation. To minimize the risk of spillovers
between buyers, enumerators ensured a predetermined
distance between households.15 Enumerators offered the
deal to only one person per household to avoid within-
household spillovers.16 With 486 sample households in
each of the three sample communes, the total sample
consisted of 1,458 buyers.17
Measurement of Primary Outcomes
Sellers offered phone credit at competitive, discounted
prices to incentivize buyers to consider purchasing.
These prices were comparable to the discounts regularly
promoted by the wireless company itself, with a key dif-
ference that PAPS’ “bonus” credit was of higher quality:
Although the wireless company’s bonus credit is not
eligible for transfers, subscription purchases, or internet
access, the bonus credit that PAPS offered was as good
as regular mobile credit and thus highly desirable. The
discounted rates did not raise buyers’ suspicions because
they fit market expectations in Senegal; the only novel
feature was the higher quality bonus credit, a believable
promotion in the competitive phone credit market.
15Only 1.6% of respondents reported telling someone farther away
than a next-door neighbor about the deal, and, because transac-
tions were conducted rapidly within blocks, the threat of spillover
effects was low.
16The household limit was explained to respondents as an admin-
istrative constraint due to the initial roll-out phase of the business.
17During an initial screening step, over 99% of respondents said
they had a cell phone and were interested in discounted phone
credit, and thus these logistical constraints are unlikely to affect
the interpretation of results.
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FIGURE 2 Percentage of Respondents with Connections
Note: Percentage of respondents reporting connections to the labeled political institution.
N = 1,422.
Buyers could choose from three purchase option lev-
els that capture different types of risk. First, to receive
the phone credit nearly instantly, buyers could pay 700
CFA and receive 1,000 CFA worth of credit. The primary
risk to buyers of this simple exchange was that the bonus
credit delivered could be of lower quality than sellers had
promised, especially as this is difficult to detect until sell-
ers may have already left the area. Second, to receive a
greater amount of credit (1,500 CFA) at a cheaper price
(500 CFA), buyers could opt for a second—and riskier—
level, for which credit delivery would occur 3 days after
the transaction took place.18 This naturally required a
greater amount of buyer trust in sellers, and attempted
to mimic the typical hold-up problems in modern mar-
kets where nondelivery is a risk in addition to defective
products. Although at first glance this delayed delivery
may have seemed odd to buyers, sellers explained that the
delay was due to administrative processing requirements
that were part of the business model that enabled these
competitive rates. These types of terms were not new to
most buyers, the majority of whom had participated in
similar sales with delay in the past.19 The third and final
purchase option available to prospective buyers increased
the risk by requiring a heftier sum (1,000 CFA) in order
to receive the most phone credit (3,000 CFA), again with
delayed delivery. The per capita daily income in the sam-
ple communes is approximately 1,500 CFA (∼3 USD), so
these costs were significant to respondents. Table 3 sum-
18The difference in cost between the first and second levels was de-
cided after extensive piloting; the framing of “less money for more
credit” was rhetorically useful for inducing respondents to seri-
ously consider the risk of the second level.
19The piloting prior to the experiment helped to ensure that the
levels of the deal struck the correct balance of competitiveness and
risk, as well as ensured that respondents were not taken aback by
the nature of the delayed delivery. Indeed, as Online Appendix N
(p. SI11) shows, respondents’ overall skepticism of the deal itself
was extremely low.
marizes the purchase options, and Figure 3 reports buy-
ers’ purchases.
I code the outcome in two ways, to distinguish be-
tween the different dimensions of risk presented by the
purchase levels. First, to measure whether potential buy-
ers were willing to engage in exchange at all, I create a
binary indicator for whether respondents purchased any
level of the deal. Second, to capture the higher risk be-
havior and the willingness to take on the added risk of
nondelivery, I also create a binary indicator for whether
respondents purchased the phone credit with delay. I
present results for both outcomes throughout.
Estimation
I estimate average treatment effects (ATEs) with the fol-
lowing OLS specification:20
yi = α + β1connect ioni + β2required cont racti
+ β3opt ional cont racti
+ β4(connect ioni × required cont racti )
+ β5(connect ioni × opt ional cont racti )
+ γXi + ηb + θe + εi, (1)
where yi is the indicator variable for purchasing at all or
purchasing with delay, Xi is a matrix of covariates, ηb are
randomization block fixed effects, and θe are enumera-
tor fixed effects. To estimate the marginal effect of each
treatment arm, I remove the interaction terms. To esti-
mate heterogeneous effects, I interact the relevant covari-
20To take account of the nonlinear nature of the purchase levels, I
also present odds ratios from multinomial logistic regressions in
Online Appendix S (pp. SI13–SI14), and to take account of the bi-
nary outcome coding, I present probit models in Online Appendix
W (p. SI17). The multinomial and probit results yield similar con-
clusions to those in the main body.
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Declined deal - - - -
No delay 700 1,000 Several minutes Risk of substandard quality
Delay ($) 500 1,500 In 3 days Risk of substandard quality and nondelivery
Delay ($$$) 1,000 3,000 In 3 days Risk of substandard quality and nondelivery
ate with the treatment terms. All tests in the article are
two-sided unless preregistered as one sided. The mod-
els control for covariates that could affect acceptance of
the deal, including age, education, employment status,
whether the buyer was a student, and gender. To rule
out competing theories of social enforcement, I also in-
clude interactive controls between treatments and buyer–
seller coethnicity or coreligiosity, which in Senegal are
the dominant informal social institutions for enforce-
ment (Cruise O’Brien 1971; Gottlieb 2017; Koter 2013).21
Additional information about control variables can be
found in the balance table presented in Online Appendix
E (p. SI5) as well as the summary statistics table in Online
Appendix F (p. SI5).
Randomization Validation and
Manipulation Check
As a heuristic for the randomization procedure’s suc-
cess, I estimate Equation (1) using individual covari-
ates to show that respondent-level traits do not predict
21The seller team represented all of the major ethnic and religious
groups of Senegal.
treatment assignment. As shown in Online Appendix
Table E2 (p. SI5), there is balance over eight covari-
ates across treatment groups. The two-sided joint F -test
of the restriction that each treatment group is indistin-
guishable from the others was rejected in only one case.
Important for the experiment was that the political
connection signal successfully induced buyers to believe
that sellers were connected. To that end, the endline
survey included a question on whether buyers thought
sellers were politically connected. Table 4 shows that
treated respondents were 18.8 percentage points more
likely to believe that sellers were politically connected,
suggesting that the political connection signal was
transmitted effectively.
Results
To test the effect of political connections and formal con-
tracts on exchange, I first estimate ATEs. I then take ac-
count of buyers’ political connections to examine how
political power asymmetries affect exchange, as well as
how buyers’ connections moderate the perceived utility
of formal contracts.
FIGURE 3 Distribution of Buyers’ Purchases
Note: Number of respondents who purchased the labeled deal level. N = 1,422.
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TABLE 4 Buyer Belief of Seller Connections
Driven by Connection Signal
Connection signaled 0.188∗∗
(0.023)
Control group outcome mean 0.169





Note: The specification is estimated using OLS, and includes ran-
domization block and enumerator fixed effects, as well as con-
trols for gender, age, education, employment status, student status,
and an interaction between treatment and buyer-seller coethnic-
ity/coreligiosity.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 from two-sided tests.
The Impact of Political Connections and
Formal Contracts on Exchange
What is the overall impact of signaling political con-
nections and offering formal contracts on propensi-
ties to trade? Table 5 presents the ATEs. These results
first show that the impact of political connections was
consistently negative (Hypothesis 1), though only ap-
proaching significance for the outcome of purchasing at
all. This suggests that sellers’ political connections af-
fected the perceived risk of substandard quality of prod-
ucts, though the multinomial results in Online Appendix
Table S12 (p. SI14) additionally indicate that connec-
tions decreased the likelihood of purchasing the more ex-
pensive delayed option as well. Importantly, these results
do not take into account buyers’ political connections,
and might thus obscure important variation that forms
around asymmetric political power. In the next section,
I incorporate buyers’ levels of political connections to
assess if asymmetries in political connections impacted
confidence in exchange.
The results in Table 5 also paint an interesting picture
of the role of formal contracts. The reported estimates
show that although offering formal contracts did not in-
duce overall purchases, they did substantially boost will-
ingness to accept the riskier delayed delivery (Hypothesis
2). Though this may appear at first blush to be an intu-
itive result, it is somewhat unexpected in Senegal’s envi-
ronment of weak norms of contract enforcement. That
formal contracts were able to increase risky purchas-
ing behavior by 10.4 percentage points is significant in
this institutional context. This increase in exchange only
occurred when the contract was a required part of the
deal and not when buyers could opt for it, suggesting that
formal contracts in these environments work best when
sellers demonstrate self-constraint as an inherent part of
the deal. Because the evidence suggests that the optional
contract treatment arm was conceptually similar to not
including a contract at all, I pool it with the control group
to improve statistical power in the remainder of the arti-
cle. Models (2) and (4) in Table 5 report these pooled
results. Results remain substantively similar throughout
the article with and without pooling the optional con-
tract group.
Turning to the models’ interactive terms, the results
are inconclusive: Though required formal contracts ap-
pear to mitigate some of the distrust that political con-
nections induce, the estimates are too noisy to draw
conclusions. This stands in contrast to previous work
that has shown that social enforcement can substitute
for formal enforcement, though as I have argued above,
political connections affect exchange through different
channels than social enforcement mechanisms. I further
parse the relationship between connections and contracts
later in the article by taking buyers’ political connections
into account.
Imbalances in Buyer–Seller Political
Connections Affect Exchange
As described above, asymmetric political power between
buyers and sellers implies unequal contract enforcement
privileges, and we should thus expect to observe differ-
ences in rates of exchange as a function of imbalances
in the trading dyad. I therefore estimate the impact of
the political connection treatment by buyers’ political
connections.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) present decomposed re-
sults by buyers’ and sellers’ political connections for
the purchased at all and purchased with delay out-
comes, respectively.22 For each subfigure, I present
group means in Panel A, and in Panel B report
covariate-adjusted differences from linear restrictions on
Equation (1).
As these figures show, the expected result of sti-
fled purchases when sellers were politically connected
did not materialize across all buyer types. Rather, ex-
change was stifled at a level approaching significance only
for the purchase at all outcome, and only for connected
buyers, who preferred to exchange with less powerful
sellers. The multinomial and probit results (Online
Appendices S and W, respectively; pp. SI13–SI14, SI17)
lend additional support for this finding. These trades
22Online Appendix I (p. SI7) presents these results in table form.
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TABLE 5 Average Treatment Effects
Outcome: Purchased at all Outcome: Purchased with delay
Unpooled Pooled Unpooled Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political connection signal −0.053† −0.044† 0.001 −0.013
(0.042) (0.031) (0.036) (0.027)
Required contract 0.047 0.048 0.104∗∗ 0.075∗
(0.043) (0.037) (0.037) (0.032)
Optional contract −0.003 0.059
(0.043) (0.037)
Political connection signal 0.045 0.035 −0.003 0.011
× required contract (0.055) (0.048) (0.048) (0.041)
Political connection signal 0.019 −0.029
× optional contract (0.055) (0.047)
Control group outcome mean 0.315 0.310 0.145 0.163
Control group outcome std. dev. 0.466 0.463 0.353 0.370
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458
Note: Each specification is estimated using OLS. The two outcomes are binary indicators for whether a buyer purchased any phone credit
option or an option with delayed delivery. Specifications include randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, and controls for
gender, age, education, employment status, student status, and interactions between treatments and buyer-seller coethnicity/coreligiosity.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 from two-sided tests and preregistered one-sided tests.
represent the cases in which buyers are most powerful
and least at-risk, in that connected buyers maintain dis-
proportionate political power and recourse options if the
deal were to go awry. Indeed, in the endline survey, when
asked what they would have done had the terms of the
exchange been violated, buyers with political connec-
tions were more likely than unconnected buyers to state
that they would pursue recourse options, more likely to
seek formal recourse options in hypothetical contract
disputes, and more likely to believe in the preferential en-
forcement power of the state (see Online Appendix U, p.
SI15).
Interestingly, there was no similar effect among
unconnected buyers. This may be due to the generally
low purchase rates, which suggest that these estimates
are perhaps a lower bound for unconnected types. This
may also be due to lack of political knowledge and ex-
perience: I show in Online Appendix T (pp. SI14–SI15)
that politically unconnected buyers were less likely to
correctly update about sellers’ political connections,
and provide suggestive evidence that some unconnected
buyers mistakenly believed that unconnected sellers were
connected. These inferential issues may help to account
for the lack of effect among unconnected buyers.
Of course, buyers’ political connections were not
randomized as part of the experiment, and these con-
nections may be indicative of other traits that are also
associated with propensities to trade. However, as I show
in Online Appendix K (p. SI8), buyers’ political connec-
tions are not strongly correlated with such variables, and
the results throughout the article are robust to includ-
ing interactive treatment controls for these potential con-
founders (see Online Appendix V, p. SI16). This lack of
correlation fits the case of Senegal, where possessing con-
nections is not necessarily a signal of other forms of priv-
ilege such as wealth; this is especially true in the middle-
to lower income neighborhoods where I implemented
the field experiment.
Overall, these results lend only partial support to
Hypothesis 3: Although connected buyers were less
likely to exchange with connected sellers, there was no
similar decrease for unconnected buyers. Thus, at least
among connected buyers, sellers’ political connections
stifled trade by enhancing the risk of receiving sub-
standard quality goods and not the risk of nondelivery,
though this latter estimate may be limited by the rel-
atively low takeup of the offer. Although not in the
scope of this article’s theory, I speculate that this might
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FIGURE 4 Effects of Sellers’ Connections by Buyers’ Connections
Note: Panels A present group means for the four subgroups. Panels B present differences estimated using OLS with linear restrictions.
The two outcomes are binary indicators for whether a buyer purchased any phone credit option or an option with delayed delivery.
Specifications include randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, and controls for gender, age, education, employment status,
student status, and interactions between treatments and buyer-seller coethnicity/coreligiosity.
† p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 from two-sided tests and pre-registered one-sided tests.
also be due to risk tolerances: Political connections
may affect the most risk-averse buyers, whereas among
more risk-seeking buyers, political connections are not
enough to deter purchasing the more lucrative delayed
options.
Formal Contracts Primarily Protect
Connected Buyers
The above ATE estimates showed that offering formal
contracts increased the probability of the riskiest types
of exchange. But how do formal contracts operate in
the context of important political connections? In a
world where the ability to enforce contracts is biased
toward the politically connected, buyers may differen-
tially value formal contracts based on their level of po-
litical connectivity. To test this claim, I estimate the im-
pact of the formal contract treatment by buyers’ political
connections.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) present these results, which re-
veal a stark pattern: The effect of formal contracts on
propensities to trade is driven primarily by connected
buyers, both for purchasing at all as well as purchasing
with delay (Hypothesis 4).23 Among unconnected buy-
23I provide the corresponding model output in table form in On-
line Appendix I (p. SI17).
ers, formal contracts had no impact on the purchased
at all outcome, and a small impact approaching signif-
icance on the purchased with delay outcome. As with
the previous models, these results are robust to interact-
ing treatment with potential confounders as well as to
controlling for predictors of social enforcement. These
findings suggest that, although formal contracts may im-
prove confidence in exchange, they do so for a particu-
lar subset of the population: those who can be confident
in their ability to sway enforcement in their favor during
disputes (see Online Appendix U, p. SI15). Formal con-
tracts may thus not enhance the recourse options or pro-
tect those who are otherwise powerless; they may be a vi-
able enforcement solution only for those who are already
most privileged in societies with selectively enforced rule
of law.
Alternative Hypotheses and Robustness
No Evidence of Social Enforcement Via In-Group Bias
or Findability Mechanisms. As shared social identity
has been shown to reduce transaction costs (Sanchez
de la Sierra 2018; Grimard 1997), buyers with similar so-
cial networks to sellers—in Senegal proxied by shared
ethnic group or religious network—may have experi-
enced a greater sense of confidence and security in the
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FIGURE 5 Effects of Formal Contracts by Buyers’ Connections
Note: Panels A present group means for the four subgroups. Panels B present differences estimated using OLS with linear restrictions.
The two outcomes are binary indicators for whether a buyer purchased any phone credit option or an option with delayed delivery.
Specifications include randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, and controls for gender, age, education, employment status,
student status, and interactions between treatments and buyer-seller coethnicity/coreligiosity.
† p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 from two-sided tests and preregistered one-sided tests.
deal compared to out-group members. This may have
also moderated treatment; for example, although polit-
ical connections may be off-putting to buyers in the ag-
gregate, they could be perceived as valuable if the seller
who has them belongs to the same in-group network.
As the estimates in the preceding sections as well as
in Online Appendix L (p. SI9) show, however, results
are robust to interactive controls between treatments
and buyer-seller coethnicity and coreligiosity. I simi-
larly rule out the possibility of findability mechanisms
(e.g., Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al.
2007), discussed in greater detail in Online Appendix M
(pp. SI9–SI10).
Addressing Confounding Interpretations of Seller Polit-
ical Connections. A potential concern is that by signal-
ing political connections, sellers transmitted information
about their quality or competence rather than induced
considerations about the probability of contract dispute
and enforcement. Questions in both the transaction stage
and the endline survey attempted to measure the valid-
ity of this concern. First, at the end of each transaction,
sellers completed a survey in which they recorded
whether buyers asked follow-up questions, as well as their
subjective measures of buyers’ levels of suspicion and po-
liteness. Second, the endline survey asked buyers about
their perceptions of sellers’ competence and trustwor-
thiness.24 I regress these measures of perceived quality
on the treatment indicators, and present the results in
Table 6.
The findings show that treatment did not drive re-
spondents’ opinions of sellers’ competence, nor did sell-
ers sense a differential level of suspicion or politeness
based on treatment status. However, buyers asked a
higher number of follow-up questions in both the con-
nection and contract treatment groups. Examining the
nature of these questions more closely, buyers typically
asked logistical questions, such as where to sign and date,
as well as some questions regarding the terms of the con-
tract. Questions related to the political connection were
typically about the nature of sellers’ work at councils and
whether they were still based there. The sum of evidence
suggests that treatment effects were not driven by con-
cerns over quality or competence.
24To reduce social desirability bias, the endline survey was con-
ducted by different enumerators than the transaction phase.
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TABLE 6 Quality Measures from Buyers and Sellers
Buyer’s perception of… Seller’s perception of…
Seller’s competence Trustworthiness # of questions asked Buyer’s politeness Buyer’s suspicion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Political connection signal −0.023 −0.035 −0.004 −0.026 0.038 0.064† 0.050 0.040 0.063 0.076
(0.032) (0.038) (0.050) (0.059) (0.028) (0.033) (0.043) (0.050) (0.069) (0.081)
Formal contract 0.044 0.026 0.073 0.040 0.033 0.072† −0.046 −0.061 0.006 0.027
(0.034) (0.045) (0.052) (0.070) (0.030) (0.039) (0.045) (0.060) (0.072) (0.096)
Political connection signal 0.035 0.066 −0.077 0.029 −0.040
× formal contract (0.058) (0.091) (0.051) (0.078) (0.126)
Control group outcome mean 3.603 3.603 2.485 2.485 0.952 0.952 3.476 3.476 0.884 0.884
Control group outcome std. dev. 0.540 0.540 0.827 0.827 0.753 0.753 0.940 0.940 1.25 1.25
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458
Note: Specifications are estimated using OLS, and includes randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, as well as controls for
gender, age, education, employment status, student status, and interactions between treatments and buyer-seller coethnicity/coreligiosity.
†p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01 from two-sided tests.
Conclusion
In areas where rule of law is selectively enforced, polit-
ical connections can produce moral hazard in exchange
and complicate the function of formal enforcement in-
stitutions. Using evidence from a field experiment in a
real trading environment, this article demonstrates that
asymmetric political connections can affect basic forms
of exchange. By showing that political connections can
prevent exchange where it would otherwise occur, this
study suggests that research that observes outcomes con-
ditional on trade may be clouded by sample biases and
excessive focus on the intensive rather than extensive
margin. And although existing work focuses on ascrip-
tive predictors of social enforcement such as coethnic-
ity, I show that political connections can explain patterns
of trade even when accounting for social enforcement.
The findings of this article suggest that low-level political
connections of both sellers and buyers merit considera-
tion for understanding patterns of private-sector growth
in developing countries.
This article also provides causal evidence that state-
backed formal contracts can boost confidence in trade,
even in environments with weak rule of law and contract
enforcement. Upon closer inspection, however, these re-
sults also highlight fundamental inequalities in develop-
ing democracies with uneven rule of law: Formal con-
tracts do not protect all buyers equally. Rather, formal
contracts primarily protect the claims of the politically
powerful. This article thus implies the limits of ad hoc
legal solutions in the presence of broader political in-
equalities. Counterintuitively, increasing the availability
of formal contracts may intensify economic inequalities
and market segmentation.
This project represents an initial, partial equilib-
rium approach to identify the impact of political con-
nections on daily types of economic exchange in mod-
ern developing markets. Future work would benefit from
examining different types of markets and connections
in order to form a unified theory across firms, indi-
viduals, and sectors—including where reputational con-
siderations significantly structure markets—and should
strive toward testing the general equilibrium implica-
tions. Although this article empirically distinguishes be-
tween core components of seller moral hazard—the risks
of substandard quality products and of nondelivery—
future research could more explicitly theorize and test
the underpinnings of this distinction. Finally, although
this field experiment highlighted the impact of political
connections and formal contracts, more work is needed
to identify the precise behavioral mechanisms behind
this impact, including the psychological foundations of
their effects.
I argue that the theory and findings of this article
are likely to apply to contexts where enforcement institu-
tions are weak and personal connections moderate ac-
cess to the state. Indeed, these conditions characterize
the bulk of the world’s developing democracies. In soci-
eties where a state apparatus exists for enforcing property
rights and contracts, and where business occurs at such a
scale that social enforcement mechanisms alone are not
viable, people must use a mixture of formal and informal
mechanisms to enforce their deals. This article provides
evidence for how informal networks of political influence
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in these places can impede the function of formal insti-
tutions in shaping private-sector economic development.
These results also help to explain how legal institutions
facilitating contract enforcement can coexist with rising
inequality and lagging development.
As emerging markets continue to develop, problems
stemming from unequal political influence in the private
sector may grow more amplified as well. This can have
distributive consequences for ordinary citizens. When
only the politically connected can contract with confi-
dence and when those without connections are averse
to exchanges with moral hazard, distinct economic net-
works can develop around differently privileged groups,
resulting in suppressed overall levels of trade and inef-
ficiencies. Understanding how informal connections—
political and otherwise—moderate institutional access
(e.g., Slough 2020) and interact with state institutions
for enforcement will thus be particularly important for
private-sector growth in the coming years.
In addition to its theory and findings, this project
contributes a design-based technique to examine these
important questions. If ethical standards are exhaustively
met, creating a business offers political scientists un-
precedented experimental control and realism, which has
implications for the study of business and politics across
a variety of settings.
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